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Criminal LawtProcedure. In re George G., 676 A.2d 764 (R.I.
1996). When the court orders the appointment of private counsel
to assist indigent litigants, the court must bear the expense of such
counsel.
When counsel is required to assist a litigant, the court ap-
points the Public Defender to assist those persons who cannot af-
ford a private attorney. If the Public Defender is not available due
to a conflict of interest, then the court must appoint private coun-
sel. It may be unclear, however, who bears the costs of such coun-
sel. In In re George G.,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
when a minor requires private counsel, the court must bear the
costs, not any other department or agency.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In George, a juvenile (George), was brought to family court for
a pre-trial hearing on criminal petitions of waywardness and a pa-
rental petition asserting disobedience. 3 The court determined that
the Public Defender's Office had a conflict of interest because it al-
ready was representing a co-defendant, and thus could not repre-
sent George.4 The family court judge subsequently ordered the
Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), which had
temporary custody of George, to retain counsel for him at DCYF's
expense.5 DCYF requested the court to vacate the order, or, in the
alternative, to stay the order pending appeal to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.6 The trial court denied these requests. 7 Thereaf-
ter, DCYF filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted.8
BACKGROUND
In June 1994, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued Execu-
tive Order No. 94-02 (Order), indicating which cases might require
1. 676 A.2d 764 (Mi. 1996).
2. Id. at 765.
3. Id. at 764.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id DCYF retained counsel for George, as ordered by the family court. Id.
8. Id.
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court-appointed counsel to assist indigent litigants.9 The Order
stated that the court previously had overspent its budget "for ap-
pointment of counsel for indigent litigants," for which deficit the
Rhode Island Legislature had made supplemental appropria-
tions. 10 Because the court must bear the costs of court-appointed
counsel and the current legislature had not provided any addi-
tional funds, the intent of the Order was to ensure that the court
stay within its budget." Specifically, the Order stated that "no
private counsel shall be appointed to assist any indigent litigants
save where constitutionally required."' 2 In addition to the situa-
tion of a juvenile facing possible incarceration, as in George, all de-
fendants are entitled to counsel when charged with a felony, both
at trial and preliminary hearings. 13 When charged with a misde-
meanor, counsel is required only where the defendant is actually
incarcerated. 14 Although the Public Defender would continue to
represent parents accused of child abuse or neglect, or where pa-
rental rights were at issue, private counsel could not be provided
with "public funds" for these cases. 15 Finally, neither guardians ad
litem nor educational advocates could be compensated by the
court. 16
A review of other jurisdictions reveals some statutory author-
ity for the allocation of the financial responsibility for private
counsel in cases involving children. For example, New Jersey re-
quires that the Office of Public Defender pay for private counsel to
represent indigent parents in child abuse or neglect cases.17 By
contrast, Florida requires that the Department of Health and Re-
9. The authority for such orders exists in Rhode Island General Laws section
8-15-2 which states, "[t]he chief justice of the supreme court shall be the executive
head of the judicial system." R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-15-2 (1985).
10. R-I. Sup. Ct. Exec. Order No. 94-002. In the prior two fiscal years, the
deficit had exceeded $300,000. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)).
14. Id. (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)).
15. Id.
16. Id Guardians ad litem could be appointed from Court Appointed Special
Advocate (CASA) attorneys, non-attorney volunteers or the private bar (on a pro
bono basis) or where the litigants would bear the costs. Id. Educational advocates
could be appointed only if the Rhode Island Commissioner of Education provided
funds. Id
17. In re RJ.B., 644 A.2d 1093 (N.J. 1994).
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habilitative Services bear the costs of providing a guardian ad li-
tern when such counsel is not constitutionally required, although
the county must pay where such counsel is mandated.'8 Georgia
provides counties with state funds to assist in the defense of
indigents. 19
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
As a threshold matter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated that the particular facts at issue were moot, but because
"the issue presented is one of importance which is capable of repe-
tition and evades review," it would address the issue.20 The family
court judge had stated that he possessed the discretion to appoint
private counsel pursuant to Executive Order No. 94-02.21 How-
ever, the supreme court held that once the trial judge found that
the charges against George might result in loss of liberty, and the
Public Defender was unavailable to represent him, the lower court
was obligated "to appoint private counsel at the expense of the
court pursuant to Executive Order No. 94-02."2 In its per curiam
opinion in this case, the court did not state explicitly whether the
lower court would have had to appoint counsel based solely on the
petitions of waywardness and disobedience. 23 However, the court
did hold that when a juvenile faces possible incarceration, the
18. In re M.P., 453 So. 2d 85, 88-91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
19. See In re Echols, 475 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-12-30 to -44 (1990)).
20. In Re George G., 676 A.2d 764, 765 (1. 1996) (citing Morris v. D'Amario,
416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.L 1980)).
21. Id- The Order states:
4. In the Family court the Public Defender may be appointed for respon-
dents charged with acts of delinquency or in the discretion of the court
where incarceration is expected for charges of acts of waywardness. Pri-
vate counsel should only be appointed in situations in which the Public
Defender is for good cause unavailable by reason of a conflict.
RI. Sup. Ct. Exec. Order No. 94-02 (1994).
22. In re George G., 676 A.2d at 765.
23. Id. Several situations exist in which a minor is entitled to counsel in
Rhode Island. R.I. R. Juv. P. 6 (1996) (minor charged with acts of delinquency and
waywardness summoned to appear in juvenile court, where such appearance may
result in detention); R.I. R. Juv. P. 8 (1996) (hearing to detain a child for a period
longer than one day); R.I. R. Juv. P. 9 (1996) (appearance before the court for ar-
raignment); RI. R. Juv. P. 12 (1996) (hearing before the court when "the child is by
law subject to waiver to the criminal jurisdiction of another court").
SURVEY SECTION
court must appoint private counsel, at court expense, if the Public
Defender is unavailable due to a conflict.24
CONCLUSION
In In re George G., the Rhode Island Supreme Court made
clear that whenever charges that could result in loss of liberty are
brought in family court against an indigent minor, the court is obli-
gated to appoint private counsel if the Public Defender is unavaila-
ble due to a conflict of interest, pursuant to its Executive Order No.
94-02. The court clarified any ambiguity that might have been
present in the language of the Order, at least insofar as the court's
obligation to provide counsel to a juvenile who faces possible incar-
ceration. It is clear that, in the future, the court must pay for ap-
pointed counsel.
Renee G. Vogel, MD, MPH
24. In re George G., 676 A.2d at 765.
19971
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377 (R.I. 1996).
Where a defendant explicitly informs the court that he intends to
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and there is legiti-
mate doubt that the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and in-
telligently, the court must conduct a competency hearing: failure
to do so is reversible error.
In a criminal proceeding, a defendant has a constitutional
right to waive counsel and proceed pro se.1 However, the waiver
must be "knowing, intelligent and voluntary,"2 which requires
consideration of "the defendant's background and experience, his
knowledge of the nature of the charges against him, possible de-
fenses, and the possible penalty; his understanding of the rules of
procedure, evidence, and... his experience in criminal trials; and
whether the waiver was the result of mistreatment or coercion."3
In State v. Chabot,4 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that it
was reversible error when the trial court failed to conduct an in-
quiry into the defendant's competence to waive counsel.5
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 21, 1995, Michael Chabot assaulted his former girl-
friend in her home, thereby violating the restraining order which
had been issued against him two weeks earlier. 6 As a result of this
incident, the State charged Chabot with violating his probation. 7
A violation hearing was scheduled before a superior court judge, at
which the defendant appeared pro se.8
During this hearing, Chabot "expressed confusion" and "con-
fessed incompetence." 9 During cross-examination, the defendant
requested that he undergo a psychiatric evaluation, claiming that
the medication he was taking for anxiety was adversely affecting
1. United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409 (11th Cir. '1989) (citing Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 682 A.2d 1377 (ILL 1996).
5. Id- at 1381.
6. Id. at 1378.
7. At various times in 1992, Chabot was charged with three separate offenses
for which he was placed on probation until the year 2002. Id. at 1379.
8. Id. at 1378.
9. Id.
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his ability to represent himself. 0 The trial judge denied the de-
fendant's request and found him in violation of the terms of his
probation." In addition to a nine year prison sentence, the judge
extended Chabot's probationary period.'2 Chabot appealed, claim-
ing that the trial court erred by extending his probation beyond the
previously imposed term,'3 and by denying his request for a psy-
chiatric evaluation. 14
BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution does
not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it
grants the accused the right to defend himself personally.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witness against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 5,
In Faretta v. California16 the United States Supreme Court
opined that implied in this language is the right to self-representa-
tion and to present one's own defense. 17 The defendant in Faretta,
charged with grand theft, notified the court well in advance of his
trial date that he wanted to proceed pro se.' 8 The trial court ruled
that the defendant had not "made an intelligent and knowing
waiver" of his right to counsel, and as such, appointed a public de-
fender to his case.' 9 The defendant was convicted, and the state
appellate court affirmed the conviction. The United States
Supreme Court, finding support in the Sixth Amendment, held
10. Id at 1378-79.
11. Id. at 1379.
12. Id,
13. Id. In making this claim, Chabot relied on State v. Taylor, 473 A.2d 290,
291 (R-I. 1984). The supreme court agreed, citing Rhode Island General Laws sec-
tion 12-19-9 (1994), which provides that when a defendant has violated probation,
the court "may remove the suspension and order the defendant committed on the
[previous sentence], or on a lesser sentence, or impose a sentence if one has not
been previously imposed, or may continue the suspension of a [previous sentence]."
Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1370.
14. Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1370.
15. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
16. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
17. Id. at 834.
18. Id. at 807.
19. Id- at 809-10.
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that the state could not demand that the defendant accept a state-
appointed public defender against his will, whether or not defend-
ant was versed in the technical, legal knowledge required to follow
proper trial procedure.20 The defendant, the Court held, could pro-
ceed pro se, so long as his decision to do so was made voluntarily
and intelligently. 21
The Eleventh Circuit narrowed this holding in United States v.
Fant.22 In Fant, the court articulated specific factors that trial
courts should consider in order to ensure that a defendant is mak-
ing a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. These
factors include the background, experience and age of the defend-
ant; the defendant's experience in criminal proceedings and his
knowledge of the nature of the charges against him; any available
defenses and the possible penalty in the event of conviction; the
defendant's familiarity with the rules of evidence and courtroom
procedure; and whether the request to proceed pro se was the re-
sult of coercion or mistreatment.23 In Fant, the court stated that
"the clear way to avoid the dilemma created by Faretta is for the
trial court to conduct a hearing on the record."24" A mere warning
to the defendant about the dangers of proceeding pro se is not
enough. 25 Representation by counsel is a fundamental right and
trial judges must ask more than just pro forma questions in order
to ensure that a defendant's request to proceed in his own defense
is knowing and voluntary.26
In State v. Hazard,27 the Rhode Island Supreme Court simi-
larly noted the danger of Sixth Amendment violations, stating that
a "violation proceeding presents the possibility of the loss of liberty
prompting the requirement of certain constitutional safeguards."28
These safeguards consist of fully determining the defendant's com-
petence when requesting waiver of counsel. 2 9
20. Id- at 835-36.
21. Id.
22. 890 F.2d 408 (11th Cir. 1989).
23. Id. at 409.
24. Id. at 410.
25. Id- at 409.
26. Id.
27. 671 A-2d 1225 (R.I. 1996).
28. Id. at 1226 (citing State v. Deroche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (RI. 1978)).
29. See Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Previously, in State v. Perry,3 0 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court addressed the validity of a defendant's waiver of his Mi-
randa rights in light of his mental deficiency. The trial judge in
Perry ruled the waiver invalid on the basis of testimony by a psy-
chologist who had tested the defendant.3 1 The trial court denied
the State's motion for a competency hearing, although one was ap-
parently mandated by statute.32 In holding that the trial court
erred when it did not order a competency hearing, the supreme
court noted that the testimony by defendant's expert was enough
to "create a suspicion of incompetence in and of itself."33 The court
stated that in evaluating a defendant's ability to comprehend his
fundamental rights and to competently waive those rights, a court
must consider the "totality of the circumstances. 34
ANALYsIs ANiD HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court acknowledged that the right
of self-representation had been granted to Chabot during the revo-
cation hearing. However, the court said, it was imperative that the
lower court conduct an inquiry into Chabot's ability to make that
decision before granting his request for a waiver of counsel.35
First, the defendant alerted the court to his recent history of psy-
chiatric illness. 3 6 He disclosed the fact that he was confused and
"incompetent."37 Furthermore, the defendant specifically asked for
30. 508 A.2d 683 (R.I. 1986).
31. I& at 687. The psychologist testified that Perry was "unable to compre-
hend the admonitions given him by the... police," based on her testing. Id. The
trial court rejected the state's witness's testimony that Perry could understand
"the essence" of the Miranda warnings. Id.
32. Id at 688. Rhode Island General Laws section 40.1-5.3-3(b) states that "if
a court in which a criminal proceeding is pending has reason to suspect that a
defendant is incompetent, it shall order an examination of the defendant by one or
more qualified physicians." Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-5.3-3(b) (1990 &
Supp. 1996)).
33. Id-
34. Id. Rejecting evidence of the defendants prior educational inadequacies
as remote and immaterial, the trial court took the position that the records
"[stretched] the totality of these circumstances beyond the breaking point." How-
ever, the supreme court stated, "[t]o suggest that the school record of a defendant
is immaterial because the record was acquired a number of years prior to the inter-
rogation is erroneous." Id
35. State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1380 (R.I. 1996).
36. Id at 1379.
37. Id. at 1378.
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a psychiatric evaluation.38 The supreme court stressed the impor-
tance of the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the pro-
ceedings and charges. "In order to effectuate a voluntary waiver of
the [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel, an inquiry into the matter
must sufficiently establish that knowledge and understanding on
the record."3 9 The trial court erred in failing to ascertain the accu-
racy and completeness of representations concerning: Chabot's al-
leged recent hospitalization for psychiatric problems; the
medications he may have taken for those problems, and their effect
on his competence to waive counsel and defend himself at the revo-
cation hearing.40 Holding "that it was incumbent upon the trial
justice to conduct a more searching inquiry of the defendant's then
existing mental health and physical condition,"4 1 the court vacated
the probation violation and remanded the case back to the trial
division for a competency hearing, stating that if the hearing indi-
cated the need for further questioning regarding defendant's com-
petency, the defendant should be ordered to undergo a psychiatric
evaluation.42
CONCLUSION
Failure to inquire into a defendant's psychiatric stability when
the defendant waives counsel constitutes reversible error.43 It is
incumbent on the trial court to establish that the defendant's
waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent, as established in
Faretta.44 The Rhode Island Supreme Court's ruling in Chabot is
consistent with its previous position on a defendant's waiver of
fundamental rights. As established in Perry, the court considers
education and intellectual ability important factors in establishing
whether the defendant is making an intelligent decision. 45 With-
out this inquiry by the trial court, a defendant's rights under the
Sixth Amendment are violated because of the uncertainty about
his ability to comprehend the proceedings and to understand the
consequences stemming therefrom. Thus, in Chabot, the court
38. Id. at 1378-79.
39. Id. at 1380-81.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1380.
42. Id. at 1381.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.; cf State v. Perry, 508 A.2d 688 (II. 1986).
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firmly establishes that protecting defendants who cannot protect
themselves is fundamental to the administration of justice.
William J. Powers, IV
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Criminal Procedure. State v. Dominguez, 679 A.2d 873 (R.I.
1996). A court may extend the time limit for filing a motion to dis-
miss if it finds excusable neglect.
Where the Rhode Island Superior Court finds "excusable ne-
glect," it may extend the ten day time limit of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 9.1, thereby allowing a criminal
defendant to move to dismiss an indictment for lack of probable
cause. In State v. Dominguez,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found such "excusable neglect" where the criminal defendant was
entitled to appointment of counsel, but no appointment was made,
and during that time the ten day period of Rule 9.1 elapsed.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Daniel Dominguez, was arraigned in Rhode Is-
land Superior Court on July 26, 1996, on a charge of conspiracy to
commit murder.2 He was referred to the Office of the Public De-
fender to determine eligibility.3 On August 9, 1996, the court was
advised that while Dominguez was eligible for representation by a
Public Defender, counsel had not yet been appointed.4 Seven days
later, counsel entered his appearance on behalf of Dominguez, but
a conflict of interest soon precluded further involvement. 5 New
counsel was assigned and she simultaneously entered her appear-
ance and a motion to dismiss.6
In the weeks between the arraignment and the final appoint-
ment of counsel, Dominguez remained pro se, but never waived his
right to counsel. 7 Also during that period, the ten day limit quietly
1. 679 A.2d 873, 874 (R.I. 1996).
2. Petitioner's Memorandum at 2, State v. Dominguez, 679 A-2d 873 (R.I.
1996).
3. Dominguez, 679 A.2d at 874.
4. Petititioner's Memorandum at 3, Dominguez (No. 95-735-M.P.).
5. I& at 3-4.
6. Dominguez, 679 A.2d at 874. This motion was filed pursuant to RlI.
Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9.1:
A defendant who has been charged by information may, within ten (10)
days after he or she has been served with a copy of the information, move
to dismiss on the ground that the information and exhibits appended
thereto do not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe that
the offense charged has beencommitted or that the defendant committed
it. The motion shall be scheduled to be heard within a reasonable time.
Id.
7. Petitioner's Memorandum at 3, Dominguez (No. 95-735-M.P.).
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expired.8 The trial judge, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss,
concluded that under Rule 9.1's ten day deadline, any motion to
dismiss "must be fled within [that] time."9 It was from this deci-
sion that Dominguez appealed.' 0
BACKGOUND
The Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provide "for
the just determination of every criminal proceeding to which they
apply."" The two rules at issue in Dominguez were Rules 9.1 and
Rule 45(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 9.1 permits a criminal defendant to request dismissal of the
charges on the ground that the information does not demonstrate
the existence of probable cause.' 2 This rule limits that opportunity
to the ten days following defendant's service of a copy of the infor-
mation.' 3 Rule 45(b) provides the court with discretion to extend
time restrictions upon the motion, even after their expiration,
where the failure to act in a timely fashion was the result of "ex-
cusable neglect."' 4 In Nichola v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co., 15 the court, applying the analogous civil rule,' 6 explained
8. Id.; Brief-In-Chief of the Defendant Petitioner at 2, State v. Dominguez,
679 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996).
9. Trial Record at 17, Dominguez, 679 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1996).
10. Dominguez, 679 A.2d at 874.
11. R.I. Super. C. R. Crim. P. 2. 'They shall be construed to secure simplicity
in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay." Id
12. LI. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 9.1.
13. Id
14. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crinm. P. 45(b). The rule reads:
Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by
order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a speci-
fied time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed
or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the fail-
ure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 33, 34 and 35, and except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
Id. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 33 (pertaining to motions for a new trial); R.I.
Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 34 (dealing with the arrest of judgment if the indictment,
information or complaint does not charge an offense or if the court was without
jurisdiction); R.I. Super. Ct. I. Crim. P. 35 (concerning the correction, decrease or
increase of a sentence).
15. 471 A.2d 945 (R.I. 1984).
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that the time limits of particular rules "should be read in conjunc-
tion with Rule 6(b), which gives the court discretion where cause is
shown to enlarge" time limits imposed by other rules. 17
HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found the language of Rule
45 clear and held that the trial court's discretionary acts fell within
Rule 45's broad reach.'5 The court found that the "record show[ed]
unequivocally that although the defendant was entitled to the ap-
pointment of counsel, none was provided."19 Therefore, the court
concluded, the defendant's failure to file the Rule 9.1 motion to dis-
miss "was the result of excusable neglect."20 At the motion hearing
to dismiss, counsel for Dominguez had argued that constitutional
concerns are raised when enlargement is denied, and when an in-
digent defendant who is entitled to, but denied counsel, must as-
sert his rights pro se, or lose them.21 Although the court did not
expressly address this issue, the opinion indicates that the justices
gave great weight to the defendant's right to counsel.22
CONCLUSION
Shifting focus from the civil to the criminal context, Domin-
guez mirrored the Nichola analysis and holding. The Dominguez
court concluded that a criminal defendant "to whom meaningful
representation is not afforded,"23 and who subsequently fails to
move to dismiss an information for lack of probable cause, has suf-
fered from excusable neglect. The brevity of the court's analysis,
however, belies the comprehensive scope of its decision; a succinct
and unembellished acknowledgement of the trial court's discretion
16. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56.
17. Nichola, 471 A.2d at 947.
18. State v. Dominguez, 679 A-2d 873, 874 (R.I. 1996).
19. Id. Defendant's counsel, in the motion to dismiss, presented the plain
meaning argument ultimately adopted by the supreme court Transcript from
Hearing on Motion at 14, Dominguez, (Dec. 1995) (P295-1960B).
20. Transcript from Hearing on Motion at 14.
21. Id- at 16.
22. Dominguez, 679 A.2d at 874.
23. Brief-In-Chief of the Defendant Petitioner at 12, Dominguez (No. 95-735-
M.P.).
SURVEY SECTION
to enlarge time limits in order to "provide for the just determina-
tion" of criminal proceedings. 24
John A. Leidecker, Jr.
24. LI. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 2. Counsel for Dominguez also raised constitu-
tional concerns regarding the adverse impact of the rule where enlargement is de-
nied and an indigent defendant, entitled to, but denied counsel, is compelled to
either assert or lose a significant right. Whether a trial judge could deny an en-
largement and satisfy the constitutional obligations at such a critical stage, she
asserted, is unlikely. Transcript from Hearing on Motion at 16, Dominguez (Dec.
1995) (P295-1960B).
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Criminal Law/Procedure. State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347 (R.I.
1996). Admissibility of expert testimony based on novel scientific
evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge, who must con-
sider its relevance, the appropriateness of expert testimony, quali-
fications of the expert, and the usefulness of the testimony to the
trier of fact.
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence is offered in court to
help prove the identity of a suspect. Such testimony relies on the
statistical probability that matched DNA samples may not be from
the same source. The lower the probability, the more likely that
the samples had the same origin. However, the assumptions un-
derlying the statistical methodology have not been scientifically
proven.' In State v. Morel,2 the Rhode Island Supreme Court up-
held the trial court's admission of disputed DNA testimony be-
cause it was relevant and would assist the trier of fact.3 The court
also agreed with the trial court's holding that any dispute about
the methodology would affect the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
David Morel was convicted of three counts of first degree sex-
ual assault and one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, for
which he was sentenced to thirty years in prison.5 Morel appealed,
claiming error on the part of the trial judge for admitting certain
expert testimony on DNA testing, as well as testimony of a prior
criminal conviction.6 Specifically, he was charged with raping a
sixteen year old female, who immediately reported it to the police.7
1. See, e.g., State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (Differentiation of genetic markers in subpopulations must be determined
empirically, according to population geneticists.). For a discussion of DNA process-
ing and statistical analysis, see Sue Rosenthal, My Brother's Keeper: A Challenge
to the Probative Value of DNA Fingerprinting, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 195 (1995).
2. 676 A.2d 1347 (ILI. 1996).
3. Id. at 1355.
4. Id. at 1356. In a separate holding in this case, which will not be discussed
in detail, the court also upheld the trial judge's admission of the defendant's prior
conviction for kidnaping to attack his credibility, after the defendant had taken the
stand in his own defense. Id. at 1356-57.
5. Id. at 1348-49.
6. Id. at 1348.
7. Id- at 1349.
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The victim was taken to an emergency room and examined by a
physician who found evidence of genital trauma "consistent with
forced sexual intercourse."s Sperm samples collected from her
body and clothing, and a sample of Morels blood, were all sent to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) laboratory for compari-
son of their DNA content.9 At trial, an FBI expert testified over
defendant's objection that "there was a one in one thousand chance
that defendant's DNA would match that of a randomly selected
Caucasian individual."10 Morel denied his guilt, and stated that he
was at his parents' home from eleven o'clock in the morning until
eight-thirty that evening," but the court allowed testimony of Mo-
rers prior conviction for kidnaping to impeach his credibility.'2
BACKGROUND
Prior to being considered by the Morel court, DNA testing had
been admitted in the majority of state and federal courts that ad-
dressed the issue.13 DNA testing involves a process by which cer-
tain genetic material is separated into bands, which may be
visually inspected to see if their patterns match.14 The relevance
of DNA testing is that if two samples match, it may help prove that
they came from the same source, for example, that a sample from
the crime scene also came from the defendant.' 5 Although a non-
match is conclusive proof that the two samples are from different
sources, 16 a match can only give rise to an inference that the sam-
ples were from the same person, because it is always possible that
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1349-50.
10. Id. at 1350.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1348. On this issue, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony "because the eye-
witness testimony of the victim had been heard by the jury, the probative value of
the prior conviction would outweigh its prejudicial impact." Id, at 1357.
13. State v. Pierce, 597 N.E.2d 107, 110-11 (Ohio 1992) (listing cases). By
1990, 38 states had admitted DNA evidence, and between 1990 and 1992, five
states passed statutes recognizing its admissibility. Id at 111 (citations omitted).
It is interesting to note that in one of the earliest criminal cases heard by a state
supreme court, the DNA evidence exonerated the defendant. Yorke v. State, 556
A.2d 230 (Md. 1989).
14. Morel, 676 A.2d at 1350-52 (explaining DNA and the processing
technique).
15. Id, at 1352.
16. Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 685 A_2d 151, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct 1996).
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someone else has the same DNA pattern.17 The statistical
probability that the two samples "coincidentally" came from differ-
ent sources is critical, because the lower the probability, the
stronger the inference that the samples came from the same per-
son.' The problem is that different statistical methods may yield
markedly different probabilities,' 9 and it is still unclear whether
the scientific assumptions underlying any of the methods are
correct.20
The debate over which method should be admitted in court
centers around two methods: the "ceiling principle" and the "prod-
uct rule."2 1 The ceiling principle mathematically adjusts for the
possibility that genetic material may not be totally independent,
but may occur more often in racial or ethnic sub-populations, due
to non-random mating between these groups.22 The product rule
assumes that each characteristic is independent, and thus, the
characteristics that have been analyzed are multiplied to obtain an
overall probability that two samples would coincidentally, or ran-
domly, match.2 3
Defendants are more likely to object to testimony based on the
product rule because it may yield a lower probability than the ceil-
ing principle, and thus allow a jury to draw a stronger inference of
identity between the samples.24 Because Morel did not object to
the admissibility of DNA evidence in general, the supreme court
only addressed the admissibility of the product rule. 25
ANALySIs AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court first discussed in detail the
scientific basis for DNA testing, the process by which samples are
prepared for analysis, and the statistical methods by which
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id at 165 (using the same sample, three different methods yielded
probabilities of one in 2220 (counting method), one in thirty million (ceiling princi-
ple), and one in ten billion (product rule)).
20. State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221, 227-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
21. State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1352-53 (R.I. 1996).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1352.
24. Id at 1353.
25. Id. at 1354.
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probability estimates are prepared.2 6 The court noted that the
product rule "is the most straightforward method of computing the
probability of obtaining a DNA profile in which the forensic and
suspect's samples match."27 However, the court also acknowledged
that if the alleles 28 are not independent, this method "may under-
estimate or overestimate the true probability of matching alleles in
the chosen population and thereby misstate the incriminating
value of the evidence."2 9 The court then addressed the fact that in
1992 the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences recommended the use of a "modified" ceiling prin-
ciple,30 even though "recent empirical studies [had] detected no
evidence of a departure from independence within or across com-
monly used genetic probes."3 1 At that time, the NRC was con-
cerned that population substructures might exist, and use of the
ceiling principle would yield a more conservative estimate that
would err, if at all, in favor of a defendant.3 2 The court also re-
viewed more recent scientific studies, including a 1996 report is-
sued by the NRC, which indicated that evidence using the product
rule was appropriate.3 3
Next, the court discussed the evidence heard by the trial judge
at the voir dire hearing held in response to Morel's motion to sup-
press the DNA evidence.3 4 The FBI presented evidence to the trial
judge about the testing procedure used, and testified that certain
adjustments were made to their calculations that actually favored
26. Id at 1350-52 (citing Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 281 (Fed-
eral Judicial Center 1994); DNA Technology in Forensic Science 35-36 (National
Research Council 1992)).
27. Id at 1352.
28. "Alleles are alternative forms of a gene at a given locus." Id- at 1350.
29. Id. at 1352.
30. The modification contains two adjustments to the calculation to account
for the possibility of a coincidental match due to population substructures. Id at
1353 (quoting Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra note 26, at 301-02).
31. Id. at 1352.
32. I& at 1352-53.
33. Id at 1353 (noting that the 1996 NRC report concluded that the "data
[from] different ethnic groups within the major races... imply that both the ceil-
ing principle and the [modified] ceiling principle are unnecessary"). The court also
noted that some experts argued that the ceiling principle was not meant to be used
exclusively, and experts could use the product rule to give their "statistical 'best
estimate' of genotype frequencies." Id. (quoting Eric S. Lander & Bruce Bodowle,
DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid To Rest, 371 Nature 735 (1994)).
34. Id. at 1353-54.
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Morel.35 In its analysis of the trial court's admission of the DNA
evidence, the supreme court stated that the decision to admit ex-
pert testimony is "within the sound discretion of the trial jus-
tice."3 6 Specifically addressing the issue of expert testimony based
on "novel scientific evidence," the court applied the four part test it
had articulated in State v. Wheeler:37 (1) is the evidence relevant;
(2) is expert testimony appropriate; (3) is the expert qualified; and
most importantly, according to the court, (4) will the testimony be
useful to the trier of fact.38 The court also noted that Wheeler was
consistent with the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals,39 in which the Court
said that the standard for admitting scientific evidence in federal
courts is that contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence.40
After reviewing the trial record, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found that the trial judge had "carefully considered each of
the criteria set forth in Wheeler," and had correctly decided "the
mixed question of law and fact concerning the reliability and valid-
ity of the DNA evidence."41 In so holding, the court noted that
when a trial court decides mixed questions of law and fact, it is
entitled to the same deference as when it makes a finding of fact,
and its decision will not be disturbed unless dearly erroneous.42
In addressing a concern that evidence might be unfairly prejudicial
to a defendant, the court noted that the method used by the FBI
"gives a defendant the benefit of any doubt about the data." 43 Fi-
nally, the court agreed with the trial judge that any dispute con-
cerning the "statistical probabilities" would affect the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility, and "thus DNA evidence is not un-
35. Id. at 1354. The FBI agent stated that the modified 10% ceiling principle
excluded approximately 99.8% of the population, whereas the product rule ex-
cluded 99.9%. Id.
36. Id- (citing State v. Capalbo, 433 A.2d 242, 246 (tRI. 1981); State v. Anil,
417 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1980); State v. Benton, 413 A-2d 104, 113 (R.I. 1980)).
37. 496 A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1985).
38. Morel, 676 A.2d at 1355.
39. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
40. Id. at 587. "[I]f scientific... knowledge will assist the trier of fact.., a
witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form of opinion or
otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
41. Morel, 676 A.2d at 1355.
42. Id. (citing Morrow v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 967,
968 (R.I. 1995); Cerilli v. Newport Offshore, Ltd., 612 A.2d 35, 39 (R.I. 1992)).
43. Id. at 1356. In this case, the product rule excluded 99.9% of the Caucasian
population, while the ceiling rule would have excluded 99.8%. Id. at 1353-54.
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like other conflicting scientific ... or medical evidence regularly
presented to juries by experts," and also subjected to cross-exami-
nation.44 The court concluded that in Rhode Island, "novel scien-
tific evidence" is admissible if it is relevant, helpful to the trier of
fact, and appropriate for presentation by a qualified expert, even
though it may be disputed in the scientific community.45
CONCLUSION
Morel was a case of first impression regarding the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence in Rhode Island. Although the holding may
appear radical because of the willingness to admit even disputed
scientific testimony, the trial judge is still responsible for examin-
ing and evaluating the basis for the evidence. Using the Wheeler/
Daubert standard merely gives the court the flexibility to admit
evidence that may not "have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field to which it belongs,"4 6 but which the court finds credi-
ble and helpful to the trier of fact.47
Renee G. Vogel, MD, MPH
44. Id at 1356.
45. Id at 1355.
46. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Wheeler, the
defendants had argued that to be admissible, the science had to be generally ac-
cepted in the scientific community under the older, and more widely used Frye test,
but the Wheeler court rejected this test. State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382, 1387-89
(II. 1985).
47. Some jurisdictions admitted the product rule under the Frye test, even
before the 1996 NRC report. See, e.g., Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995).
But see State v. Streich, 658 A.2d 38 (Vt. 1995).
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Criminal Law. State v. Price, 672 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1996). The com-
mon law offense statute does not limit the court's inherent power
to punish an individual for criminal contempt.
In State v. Price,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered
whether the court's inherent power to penalize criminal contempt
was limited by Rhode Island General Laws section 11-1-1.2 Re-
versing the family court, the supreme court held that the court's
inherent power to punish for contempt was not limited by section
11-1-1.3 The court stated that the statute applies only to common
law offenses for which no punishment is prescribed by the general
laws, and contempt is not one of those offenses.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
At age 15, Craig C. Price was adjudged delinquent on four
counts of murder by the Rhode Island Family Court.5 On Septem-
ber 21, 1989, he was committed to the Rhode Island Training
School6 until the age of twenty-one.7 The court had also ordered
him to undergo psychiatric evaluation as part of a court-ordered
treatment plan,8 and almost five years passed and Price had yet to
comply with the court ordered evaluation. 9 On August 4, 1994, the
State brought charges against Price alleging that his failure to
comply with the ordered evaluation constituted criminal con-
tempt.' 0 Price filed a motion to amend the complaint arguing that
1. 672 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1996).
2. Id. Hereinafter referred to as the common law offense statute, Rhode Is-
land General Laws section 11-1-1 states that "[e]very act and omission which is an
offense at common law, and for which no punishment is prescribed by the general
laws, may be prosecuted and punished as an offense at common law. Every person
who shall be convicted of... a misdemeanor at common law shall be imprisoned
for a term not exceeding one year." Id. at 894 (quoting R.I. Gen- Laws § 11-1-1
(1994)).
3. Id
4. Id. at 897-98.
5. Id. at 894-95.
6. The training school is a locked detention facility for children under the
auspices of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families. See R.I.
Gen Laws § 42-56-33 (1993).
7. Price, 672 A.2d at 895.
8. Id.
9. Id
10. Id. Price refused to participate in evaluation and treatment programs on
numerous occasions between November 16, 1989, and July 6, 1994. He was 20
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contempt is a misdemeanor offense, not a felony.' The family
court agreed with Price's assertion that criminal contempt was a
misdemeanor at common law.' 2 Based upon section 11-1-1, the
court held that punishment for misdemeanor criminal contempt
could not exceed one year. 3 The State appealed, contending that
the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt was not
limited by the common law offense statute. 14
BACKGROUND
When the Rhode Island Supreme Court was established in
1798, the Rhode Island General Assembly expressly granted the
court inherent powers to punish individuals for contempt.' 5 This
grant was an "affirmation of the inherent power" .given to courts
under the common law of England.' 6 It had long been held that
courts may punish criminal contempt summarily.' 7 Legislation
has never been enacted to limit the punishment that courts may
impose for contempts, and any legislative limitations may invoke a
separation of powers issue.' 8
years old and close to release from the training facility when these charges were
filed. Id.
11. IM Price also filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.
Id.
12. Id
13. Id.
14. Id at 896.
15. Id- An Act to Establish a Supreme Judicial Court in This State, 1798 RI.
Pub. Laws § 4 (current version in R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-1 (1985 & Supp. 1996).
Later, the powers were extended to the family court. RI. Gen. Laws § 8-10-38
(1993). The Act provided that the 'Supreme Judicial Court [of Rhode Island] shall
have the power to... punish by fine or imprisonment, at the reasonable discretion
of said Court, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same."
Id (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 8-6-1 (1985)).
16. Id. at 895. "The process of attachment for... contempts must necessarily
be as ancient as the laws themselves; for laws without competent authority to se-
cure their administration from disobedience and contempt would be vain and nega-
tory." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1968) (citing William Blackstone, 4
Commentaries on the Laws of England 286-87 (describing contempt cases)). 'The
inherent power to punish for [criminal] contempt has long been recognized as part
of our country's common law." Price, 672 A.2d at 896 (citations omitted).
17. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 191 n.2 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (chronicling the history of the treatment of criminal contempt).
18. Price, 672 A.2d at 896 n.2. The General Assembly may not constitution-
ally exercise judicial functions. Id. (citing G & P Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 RI. 324,
343 (1856)).
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Abuses by courts of the open-ended contempt authority led
both the legislature and the courts to limit the contempt power.19
The Rhode Island contempt statute is considered equivalent to the
federal contempt statute,20 which was written to limit the author-
ity of federal courts, and which describes the conduct punishable
by the courts under the contempt powers.2 1
Rule 42 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure al-
lows the court to fix punishments for contempt.22 Rule 42 was also
similar to its federal counterpart, and neither rule provided any
limitations on the court's authority to punish.23 The United States
Supreme Court ruled in Bloom v. Illinois24 that due process and
trial by jury may be invoked in criminal contempt cases.25 The
Court stated that "'im]ost other western countries seem to be
highly restrictive of the latitude given judges to try their own con-
tempts without a jury."26 Courts and legislatures slowly have
eroded the contempt powers of judges. 27
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The State argued that section 11-1-1 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws was not intended to be applied to the inherent powers of
courts in punishing criminal contempt.as The purpose of section
11-1-1, the State argued, was to assure punishment of a person
19. The limitations to the inherent contempt powers were delineated in the
Act of 1831, 4 Stat 487. The Act was established to curtail the courts and limited
the contempt powers to misbehavior in the presence of the court that obstructs
justice, misbehavior of court officers, and disobedience to the lawful writ, process,
order or decree of the court. These provisions have continued as the basis for 18
U.S.C. § 401. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 203-4.
20. Rhode Island General Laws section 8-6-1 is given the same interpretation
as the United States Supreme Court has given to 18 U.S.C. § 401. See Price, 672
A.2d at 896.
21. Id
22. Id. at 897 (citing R.I Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 42(b)). Rule 42 provides many
procedural protections for criminal contemnors. Upon finding guilt, "the court
shall enter an order fixing the punishment." Id.
23. Id.
24. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
25. Id. at 207 ("If the right to jury trial is a fundamental matter in other crimi-
nal cases, which we think it is, it must also be extended to criminal contempt
cases.").
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Price, 672 A.2d at 895.
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that has committed an offense at common law, offenses for which
punishment was not otherwise provided.29
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the State that
the punishment for contempt of the court's authority was not con-
trolled by the common law offense statute.30 The court's inherent
powers to punish for contempts made the common law statute "in-
applicable and wholly unnecessary to ensure contempts could be
punished."31 The court reasoned that the common law offense stat-
ute was not intended to be used as a restraint of the court's con-
tempt powers. 32
The supreme court also stated that "it is nonetheless indispu-
table that Congress has imposed no statutory limitation on the ex-
tent of the punishment that the federal courts may impose in
sentencing for contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401."33 This conclusion
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court is in contradiction with Bloom,
where the United States Supreme Court asserted that the intent of
Congress to punish contempt has been substantially curtailed to
the present day.34 The Bloom Court noted that over half the states
limit punishment for contempt to one year or less.3 5
In Price, the court recognized that the United States Supreme
Court, while not imposing limitations on sentencing for contempts,
did caution lower courts regarding their special duty to exercise
"responsibility and circumspection."36 The court reversed the
judgment and returned the papers to the family court.37
29. Id- at 898. Rhode Island General Laws section 11-1-1 provides that an
offense at common law which is not covered by the general laws may be prosecuted
as a misdemeanor, and provides for imprisonment for not more than one year or a
fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. Id.
30. Id. at 897-98.
31. Id-
32. I&
33. I& at 897. (citing Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 188 (1958)). The
United States Supreme Court overruled Green in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968). In Bloom, the Court noted that Congress had limited contempt punish-
ments in the Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1957
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 1964 Civil Rights Act limited fines to $1000
or imprisonment for six months, and required proof of criminal mens rea. Bloom,
391 U.S. at 204 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h)).
34. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 203.
35. Id- at 206 n.8. The Court stated that many punishments for criminal con-
tempt have been set aside because they were unauthorized by statute or were too
harsh. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Green, 356 U.S. at 188).
37. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has vested tremendous
power in the courts to punish criminal contempt. Without knowing
the express intent of the legislature, the court has assumed the
power on historical grounds. Unfortunately, abuses of this un-
trammeled contempt power have historically led to legislative re-
strictions on the punishments allowed. Rhode Island appears to be
going against the modern trend evinced by the United States
Supreme Court in Bloom: a more restrictive use of the court's con-
tempt powers, with many states looking to the legislature to define
appropriate punishments.
Lesley S. Rich
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Criminal Law. State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1996). A
trial judge shall exercise a "gatekeeping" function and conduct a
preliminary examination prior to allowing scientific evidence of re-
pressed recollections to be submitted to the jury where that evi-
dence is challenged by an appropriate objection or motion' to
suppress.
Rhode Island's courts were recently faced with expert scientific
testimony regarding repressed recollections, a relatively novel sci-
ence, in State v. Quattrocchi.1 In Quattrocchi, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court was confronted with a criminal defendant's chal-
lenge to the admission of such testimony.2 The court concluded
that the trial judge is obligated to ascertain the reliability of such
scientific evidence as a precondition to its admission when that evi-
dence is challenged.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
John Quattrocchi was convicted of two counts of first degree
sexual assault in Rhode Island Superior Court.4 The complaining
witness, Gina (a fictitious name), had known the defendant for
thirteen years at the time of trial.5 The relationship between Gina
and the defendant began in 1978, while Quattrocchi was dating
Gina's mother. The defendant assumed a paternal role with Gina,
and continued involvement in her daily life even after dissolution
of his relationship with her mother. 6
1. 681 A.2d 879 (RI. 1996). The Quattrocchi court decided two other matters
in addition to the issue discussed herein. The court held that, when requested by
the attorney general, a county grand jury has jurisdiction to return an indictment
with respect to an incident that took place on Narragansett Bay, despite the exist-
ence of a statewide grand jury. Moreover, the court determined that testimony
concerning uncharged and unrelated incidents of sexual encounters, where the de-
fendant did not place his character at issue, were of such "extreme prejudice that
no curative instruction would have been adequate to overcome or even palliate its
effect." Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 884.
4. I& at 879.
5. Id. at 879-80. Gina was 19 years old when the case was heard.
6. Id at 879. Gina was three or four years old when the defendant began
dating her mother, and she did not know her biological father. Id. After the rela-
tionship with Gina's mother ended, "the defendant [continued to give] gifts to
Gina, read to her, paid her private school tuition for two years of high school, at-
19971
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Following two years of psychotherapy, Gina was twice admit-
ted to Butler Psychiatric Hospital and treated for depression in the
spring of 1992.7 While at Butler, doctors originally diagnosed Gina
as suffering from a bipolar disorder." However, following a series
of "flashbacks" in which she recalled incidents of abuse by the de-
fendant, doctors substituted a diagnosis of post traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD).9 The treating physician, Dr. Daniel Harrop,
Ph.D., testified at trial that PTSD is precipitated by traumatic
stress or a traumatic event, including sexual abuse, outside normal
human experience.' 0 The trial judge admitted, in the presence of
the jury, evidence of both the flashback recollections and the expert
testimony in corroboration thereof without holding a preliminary
evidentiary hearing to assess the reliability and competency of
such testimony." According to the judge, the probative value of
the evidence went to its weight, not its admissibility.' 2 The de-
fendant did not ask the trial judge to conduct a preliminary hear-
ing or to make any determination concerning the reliability or
applicability of the evidence, but he did file a motion in limine to
suppress or exclude the evidence. 13 In its rebuttal, the State
presented evidence concerning unrelated sexual incidents between
the defendant and two minor girls. 14 The trial court held that this
evidence was inadmissible due to its extreme prejudicial nature.' 5
BACKGROUND
For courts, finding a precise fit between the law and scientific
developments offered as evidence has proven elusive. For decades,
courts have followed the standard announced in Frye v. United
tended school events with her, celebrated holidays with her and encouraged her
educational and career aspirations." Id.
7. Id. at 879.
8. Id. 'Bipolar disorder is [a mental illness] sometimes described as manic
depression." Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 881.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 888.
14. Id. at 884-85. The first incident occurred in 1977. It went unreported and
was relayed by the victim to her parents several years later. The second incident
occurred in 1981. In that instance, the defendant was charged and arrested by the
police; however, the grand jury returned a finding of "not true bill." Id. at 885.
15. Id at 885-86.
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States.16 The Frye court, faced with a proffer of purported scien-
tific evidence, rejected the scientific evidence because the propo-
nent did not demonstrate that it was generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community. 17 The Frye standard for admission
became widely used.""
Nearly one-half century after Frye, the federal courts adopted
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which now govern, inter alia, the
admission of evidence, including scientific evidence. 19 The Frye
standard, however, survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and remained intact until Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.20 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court
was presented the question, "Does Frye or do the Federal Rules of
Evidence provide the standard for admitting expert scientific evi-
dence in a federal trial?"2 ' The Court held that the federal rules
provide the standard for admitting evidence.22 Thereafter, the
Court articulated guidelines for assessing, as a precondition to ad-
mission, the reliability of scientific evidence. 23
Though Rhode Island's standard for the admission of scientific
evidence developed independently, its development paralleled the
national trend.24 In one early case, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court concluded that the trial court's admission of the results of an
16. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17. I& at 1014. The Frye court was faced with a proffer of purported scientific
evidence derived by a machine that measured changes in systolic blood pressure
from which the veracity of statements could be inferred. Id. at 1013-14. It rejected
this early lie detector because the proponent of the evidence did not demonstrate
that it was generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Id. at
1014.
18. John William Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 363 (4th ed.
1992).
19. Id. at 362; see Fed. 1. Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.").
20. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
21. Id
22. Id- at 2795.
23. Id. at 2796-97.
24. See generally State v. Dery, 545 A.2d 1014 (ILI. 1988); State v. Wheeler,
496 A.2d 1382 (LI. 1985); Sweet v. Hemingway Transp., Inc., 333 A.2d 411 (R.I.
1975); Powers v. Carvalho, 281 A.2d 298 (R.I. 1971); State v. Gregoire, 148 A.2d
751 (R.I. 1959).
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Alcometer test constituted reversible error.25 The court stated
that reliance upon novel science "depends upon general acceptance
of its reliability by experts in the relevant scientific field."26 More
recently, in State v. Wheeler,27 the court recognized the potency of
expert testimony. Cautioning against the admission of untested
and unproven science, the court observed that experts may "as-
sume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of lay-
men."28 Ultimately, the court opined that admission of expert
testimony required only that the trial judge conclude that the evi-
dence is relevant and helpful to the trier of fact.29
After the Wheeler decision, Rhode Island adopted its own rules
of evidence, whose language closely tracks the language of the fed-
eral rules regarding the use of expert testimony.30 Though they
have looked to the federal courts for guidance in interpreting the
Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, 3 ' Rhode Island courts have yet to
adopt Daubert's recommendations. With respect to the narrow is-
sue of repressed memories, Rhode Island courts have only recently
had the opportunity to speak.3 2
ANALYsiS AND HOLDING
In State v. Quattrocchi, the court did not attempt to resolve the
controversy regarding the reliability and admissibility of repressed
25. Gregoire, 148 A.2d at 754 (upholding the same standard articulated in
1923 by the Frye court). The Alcometer test was a precursor to the modern day
breathalyser. Id-
26. Id. (quoting Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof § 220).
27. 496 A.2d 1382 (RI. 1985).
28. Id. at 1387-88 (quoting State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio 1983)
(quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974))).
29. Id at 1388-89.
30. The Rhode Island Rules of Evidence became effective on October 1, 1987.
R.I. R. Evid. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion.").
31. See, e.g., State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954 (RI. 1995); State v. Traficante,
636 A.2d 692 (RI. 1994); State v. Garcia, 622 A.2d 446 (RI. 1993); IBEW, Local 99
v. United Pac. Ins., 573 A.2d 270 (R.I. 1990).
32. State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879 (1996); Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d
873 (R.I. 1996) (answering questions certified from the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island). The Kelly court limited claims made
against non-perpetrator defendants where testimony based upon repressed mem-
ory recollections was admitted. Id. at 883-84.
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memories or supporting expert testimony.3 3 The cases cited by the
court, however, evince a cautious skepticism of the new science.3 4
For example, the Washington Supreme Court, in Tyson v. Ty-
son,35 declined to extend the statute of limitations based on the
claim of repressed memory, observing that "[pisychology and psy-
chiatry are imprecise disciplines," and distinguished the subjectiv-
ity of psychological science with the objectivity of the biological
sciences.3 6 The court later commented that the "distance between
historical truth and psychoanalytic 'truth' is quite a gulf."37
A Wisconsin court similarly refused to extend its statute of
limitations to accommodate repressed memories. 38 That court
evinced a concern in its decision that truth may prove elusive in
"this esoteric and largely unproved field" even v ith careful cross-
examination.3 9 This same concern was voiced by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, which noted that it remained uncon-
vinced that a "thorough cross-examination can effectively expose
any unreliable elements or assumptions in [the psychologist's] tes-
timony."40 Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court, faced with
hypnotically induced or enhanced testimony, addressed procedural
requirements and established that the trial judge will review the
record of the evidence outside the presence of the jury as a precon-
dition to admission.4 1
33. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d at 881-83.
34. These jurisdictions cited by the court were frequently faced with the ques-
tion as to whether statutes of limitations should be extended and whether discov-
ery rules should be modified in order to accommodate recently resurrected
recollections. In each instance the courts expressed concern about the reliability of
the testimony. See generally Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d
780 (Wis. 1995) (expressing skeptism concerning courts' ability to ascertain truth
regarding complaints based on repressed memory and declining to extend statute
of limitations in a case involving this claim); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H.
1993) (reversing a criminal conviction for aggravated felonious assault of children
while expressing concern regarding the subjectiveness of methodology used in psy-
chiatric evaluations); Tyson v. Tyson, 727 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1986) (declining to al-
low for extension of the statute of limitations based on claim of repressed
memories).
35. Tyson, 727 P.2d at 230.
36. Id- at 229.
37. Id (citing Marianne Wesson, Historical Truth, Narrative Truth, and Ex-
pert Testimony, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 331, 338 (1985)).
38. Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis. 1995).
39. Id. at 788 (quoting Steele v. State, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (Wis. 1980)).
40. State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 701 (N.H. 1993).
41. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-97 (N.J. 1981).
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In Quattrocchi, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's concerns
appeared two-fold. First, the sciences of psychology and psychiatry
are imprecise.4 2 Second, the methodology used in psychological as-
sessments may not be sufficiently amenable to courtroom analysis,
making the "presentation of evidence effectively beyond re-
proach."4 3 Having articulated its fears, the court resolved its con-
cerns by requiring the procedural mechanism it had suggested in
Wheeler. 4 The trial judge "exercise[s] a gatekeeping function" by
holding a preliminary evidentiary hearing outside the presence of
a jury to determine the reliability and appropriateness of the prof-
fered testimony.4 5 At that time, "the essential findings of fact and
conclusions of law" must be made. 4 6 The court confined this re-
quirement, however, to those situations where the proffer is chal-
lenged by an appropriate objection or motion to suppress.4 7 The
court, by analogizing the situation to one where a confession is
challenged on the issue of voluntariness, reasoned that failure to
conduct such a hearing deprives the defendant of the opportunity
to "actively" challenge the admissibility of the proffer.48
CONCLUSION
The court's decision to require a preliminary evidentiary hear-
ing creates a territorial consistency in Rhode Island between fed-
eral and state courts, obliged as the federal courts are to conduct a
preliminary hearing consistent with Daubert. Moreover, the deci-
sion maintains the liberal trend of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence.
What remains unclear, however, are the guidelines to be uti-
lized by trial judges when assessing the reliability of such evi-
dence. Daubert's guidelines were not mandated by the Quattrocchi
court. Indeed, the court specifically indicated that it had not aban-
doned the test enunciated in Frye.4 9 Even if Daubert's guidelines
were adopted, it is doubtful that, apart from the general accept-
ance test, they could serve to guide the courts when assessing the
42. State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 881-82 (RI. 1996).
43. Id. at 883.
44. Id. at 884.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 884 n.2.
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reliability of psychological sciences. What tests will sufficiently
validate theories upon which the proffer is based? Can error rates
be calculated for psychological sciences? Unfortunately, the Quat-
trocchi court does not outline any other guidelines, in spite of its
express acknowledgment that it had not previously given "ade-
quate guidance to a trial justice when confronted with the proffer
of a novel and controversial body of scientific evidence."5 0
Although the court relies on the procedural protections it had re-
quired previously to ensure the reliability of evidence prior to its
admission, the earlier cases concerned the more quantifiable
"hard" sciences.5 1
The Quattrocchi court's narrow mandate is sufficiently elastic
to accommodate other psychological sciences the court may yet
face. Relying on the general acceptance requirement of Daubert
and Frye as a precondition to admission under Rule 702 will en-
sure that untested and questionable "soft" sciences will not get
before the jury.5 2
John A. Leidecker, Jr.
50. Id. at 884.
51. Id.
52. For example, in recent cases courts have been faced with defenses such as
urban trauma, neonaticide syndrome, and Arab trauma. See Junda Woo, Urban
Trauma Mitigates Guilt, Defenders Say, Wall Street J., Apr. 27, 1993, at B1; Peo-
ple v. Wernick, 215 A.2d 50 (1995); An 'Arab Trauma" Defense for Baz, The New
Yorker, Nov. 28, 1994, at 50.
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Criminal Law. State v. Russell, 671 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1996). Au-
thority to enter into binding and enforceable non-prosecution
agreements with criminal defendants rests solely with the Office of
the Attorney General.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In May of 1993, David Russell's apartment was searched by
the East Providence police department pursuant to a valid search
warrant.' During this search, the police uncovered marijuana,
drug paraphernalia and a firearm.2 As a result, Russell was
charged with manufacturing marijuana, possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver, and possession of a firearm while possessing
marijuana with intent to deliver.3
In court, Russell moved to dismiss two of the charges 4 on the
ground that he and an officer of the East Providence police depart-
ment had made an agreement. 5 Russell alleged that he was prom-
ised immunity in return for information regarding the source of his
marijuana supply.6 The superior court judge found that the East
Providence detective had entered into an agreement of non-prose-
cution with Russell, and that Russell "had substantially complied
with that agreement."7 As a result, Russell's motion to dismiss
was granted8 and the Attorney General filed an appeal.9
1. State v. Russell, 671 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1996).
2. Id-
3. Id.
4. Id Russell sought to overturn the charges of possession of marijuana, and
possession of a firearm while possessing or intending to deliver the marijuana
Procedurally, Russell was brought before the superior court pursuant to Rule 32(f)
of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under this rule, '[the court
shall not revoke probation or revoke a suspension of sentence or impose a sentence
previously deferred except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be afforded
the opportunity to be present and appraised of the grounds on which such action is
proposed." R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(f). Apparently, Russell had received pro-
bation on a previous charge and these two new charges placed him in violation of
that probation. Russell, 671 A.2d at 1222.
5. Id. at 1222-23.
6. Id. at 1222.
7. Id. at 1222-23.
8. Id. at 1223.
9. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-24-32 (1985). "In any criminal proceeding, the attor-
ney-general shall have the right to object to any finding, ruling, decision, order or
judgment of the superior court... and ... may appeal ... at any time before the
defendant has been placed in jeopardy." Id.
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BACKGROUND
In Rhode Island, it is well established that prosecutorial dis-
cretion is vested solely in the Attorney General.' 0 This elected offi-
cial, and those authorized by him, make the ultimate decision
whether to prosecute or not to prosecute. 1 Additionally, in this
state there is a specific statutory procedure for the granting of im-
munity from prosecution, and its scope extends only to a limited
class of individuals. 12 Under this statute, "[w]henever a witness
... refuses ... to answer a question or to produce other evidence of
any kind ... the Attorney General may, in writing, request the
presiding justice of the superior court or the chief judge of the fam-
ily court or the district court to order the witness to answer" or
produce desired evidence.13 This formal limitation on immunity
from prosecution in no way deprives the Attorney General of his
inherent prosecutorial discretion. However, this provision "is il-
lustrative of the various safeguards that surround the granting of
imxnutnity. "
14
Other jursidictions, such as Pennsylvania and Alaska have ac-
cepted the proposition that police officers lack authority to enter
into non-prosecution agreements. For example, in Green v. State,15
a defendant claimed he had been told that burglary and theft were
"not... very serious crime[s]" and he interpreted this statement
as a promise that he would not be prosecuted.' 6 Additionally,
while the defendant was physically incarcerated, he was asked to
sign a statement entitled, "Voluntary Statement (Not Under
Arrest)."17 Despite these rather extraordinary facts, the court of
appeals held "that police officers, acting on their own, cannot enter
into a binding immunity or nonprosecution agreement with a sus-
pect or defendant."' 8
10. Jefferson v. State, 472 A2d 1200, 1204 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rollins, 359
A.2d 315, 318 (R.I. 1976) (citing Rogers v. Hill, 48 A. 670 (LI. 1901)).
11. Russell, 671 A.2d at 1223.
12. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-17-15 (1994).
13. I&
14. Russell, 671 A.2d at 1223.
15. 857 P.2d 1197 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
16. Id. at 1198.
17. Id.
18. Id- at 1201. The Court of Appeals of Alaska relied on decisions from sev-
eral states, including Michigan, Maryland, Alabama, Arizona, Missouri and West
Virginia. Id.
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In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
addressed the issue when it ruled on the validity of the alleged
agreement between Russell and the East Providence police
department.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Since Rhode Island had never ruled on this precise issue, the
court accepted the Attorney General's reference to other jurisdic-
tions. Notably, the court reviewed the holding of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Stipetich.19 With facts
almost identical to Russell, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that "district attorneys, in their investigative and
prosecutorial roles, have broad discretion over whether charges
should be brought in any given case.. . [and this] power to prose-
cute cannot be restricted by the actions of ... police officers."20
Persuaded by both the previous Rhode Island cases 21 and the rea-
soning in Stipetich,22 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held [t]he
East Providence detective had no authority to enter into a binding
agreement of nonprosecution without the consent of the Attorney
General."23 Since the Attorney General's consent was lacking, the
court reversed the order dismissing the two criminal informations
and the probation violation proceeding.24
CONCLUSION
The rule adopted by the court is supported by sound policy and
the common law of foreign jurisdictions. However, this decision
may have the undesired effect of making suspects, and later de-
fendants, more distrustful of the police. To prevent this potential
adverse effect, a rule should be adopted to prohibit law enforce-
ment officers from making unauthorized promises, such as the
non-prosecution promise in Russell.
Mark B. Watson
19. 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995).
20. Id. at 1295.
21. Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200 (R.I. 1984); State v. Rollins, 359 A.2d 315
(RI. 1976); Rogers v. Hill, 48 A- 670 (R-I. 1901).
22. State v. Russell, 671 A.2d 1222, 1223 (R.I. 1996).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Id.
